曹兆英, 梁日新, 齐保垒. 纾困以求诚:税收激励对企业“漂绿”的治理效应研究J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (6): 14-24.
引用本文: 曹兆英, 梁日新, 齐保垒. 纾困以求诚:税收激励对企业“漂绿”的治理效应研究J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (6): 14-24.
Cao Zhaoying, Liang Rixin, Qi Baolei. Securing Relief in Pursuit of Sincerity: A Study on the Governance Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate GreenwashingJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (6): 14-24.
Citation: Cao Zhaoying, Liang Rixin, Qi Baolei. Securing Relief in Pursuit of Sincerity: A Study on the Governance Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate GreenwashingJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (6): 14-24.

纾困以求诚:税收激励对企业“漂绿”的治理效应研究

Securing Relief in Pursuit of Sincerity: A Study on the Governance Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate Greenwashing

  • 摘要: 有效治理企业“漂绿”问题是实现“双碳”战略目标的重要保障,现有研究多强调强制性规制、外部监督等外部约束在遏制企业“漂绿”中的作用,但对政策激励的关注相对较少。增值税留抵退税改革覆盖化学原料、电子信息、医药等行业和电网企业,与“漂绿”高发行业企业存在较高重合。本文以增值税留抵退税改革为代表,以存在环境信息披露行为的沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究发现税收激励政策显著抑制了企业“漂绿”行为。作用机制一是缓解企业融资约束,降低企业通过“漂绿”策略获取外部融资的动机;二是提升管理层对企业未来发展前景的信心,使其更加注重可持续发展战略,增加实质性环保投资。进一步分析表明,环境规制强度较高地区、污染行业、资本密集型和规模较大的企业,留抵退税改革对企业“漂绿”行为的抑制作用更显著;留抵退税改革对“漂绿”的抑制作用有助于提升企业信息披露质量、降低ESG评级分歧。本文丰富了税收激励影响微观企业行为的相关文献,也对企业“漂绿”问题的治理实践有启示意义。

     

    Abstract: Effectively governing corporate greenwashing is an important safeguard for achieving the strategic goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality. Existing research mostly emphasizes the role of external constraints—such as mandatory regulation and external oversight—in curbing corporate greenwashing, while paying relatively little attention to policy incentives. The value-added tax (VAT) credit refund reform covers industries such as chemical raw materials, electronic information, and pharmaceuticals, as well as power grid enterprises, and substantially overlaps with industries in which greenwashing is prevalent. Taking the VAT credit refund reform as a representative case and using a sample of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges that engage in environmental information disclosure, this study finds that the tax incentive policy significantly inhibits corporate greenwashing. The underlying mechanisms operate through two channels: first, the policy alleviates corporate financing constraints, thereby reducing firms' incentive to obtain external financing through greenwashing strategies; second, it enhances management's confidence in the firm's future development prospects, leading them to place greater emphasis on sustainable development strategies and to increase substantive environmental protection investment. Further analysis indicates that the inhibitory effect of the credit refund reform on corporate greenwashing is more pronounced for firms located in regions with stronger environmental regulation, firms in polluting industries, and capital-intensive and larger firms; moreover, the inhibitory effect of the reform on greenwashing helps to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure and reduce ESG rating divergence. This study enriches the literature on how tax incentives affect the behavior of micro-level firms and offers implications for the practical governance of corporate greenwashing.

     

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