张家轩, 李化龙. 年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (8): 26-36.
引用本文: 张家轩, 李化龙. 年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (8): 26-36.
Zhang Jiaxuan, Li Hualong. Annual Report Tone and Managerial Excess Compensation: Ability Reward or Expectation ManipulationJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (8): 26-36.
Citation: Zhang Jiaxuan, Li Hualong. Annual Report Tone and Managerial Excess Compensation: Ability Reward or Expectation ManipulationJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (8): 26-36.

年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵

Annual Report Tone and Managerial Excess Compensation: Ability Reward or Expectation Manipulation

  • 摘要: 年报管理层讨论与分析的情感语调既可能反映管理层经营能力和对企业未来发展的信心,也可能成为管理层印象管理和提升薪酬评价的工具。本文以沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究发现年报语调越积极,管理层未来的超额薪酬越高,该关系在由四大会计师事务所审计、市场竞争程度较低的企业中更显著。机制识别发现,年报语调对管理层超额薪酬的影响主要源于管理层预期操纵,而非对管理层能力的嘉奖。一是企业经营业绩并未强化年报语调与管理层超额薪酬间的正向关系;二是超出基本面支撑的年报异常积极语调对管理层超额薪酬有解释力;三是基于经营业绩表现和异常积极语调的四象限分组结果显示,年报语调对管理层超额薪酬的影响主要发生在低业绩且存在异常积极语调的企业中。经济后果分析表明,年报积极语调的薪酬效应会降低管理层的薪酬业绩敏感性,加剧企业投资不足,降低企业未来经营业绩。本文揭示了非财务文本信息在高管薪酬契约中的作用,为完善薪酬委员会信息甄别机制、强化文本信息披露监管提供了参考。

     

    Abstract: The emotional tone of the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in annual reports may reflect management's operational capabilities and confidence in the enterprise's future development, but it may also become a tool for management impression management and improving compensation assessments. Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies, this paper finds that the more positive the annual report tone, the higher the future excess compensation for the management, and this relationship is more significant in enterprises audited by the Big Four accounting firms and with lower market competition levels. Mechanism identification reveals that the impact of annual report tone on managerial excess compensation mainly stems from management's expectation manipulation rather than a reward for managerial ability. First, corporate operating performance does not strengthen the positive relationship between annual report tone and managerial excess compensation. Second, an abnormally positive annual report tone beyond fundamental support has explanatory power for managerial excess compensation. Third, the four-quadrant grouping results based on operating performance and abnormally positive tone show that the impact of annual report tone on managerial excess compensation mainly occurs in enterprises with poor performance and an abnormally positive tone. Economic consequence analysis indicates that the compensation effect of positive annual report tone reduces management's pay-performance sensitivity, exacerbates enterprise underinvestment, and lowers the enterprise's future operating performance. This paper reveals the role of non-financial textual information in executive compensation contracts, providing a reference for improving the information screening mechanism of compensation committees and strengthening the regulation of textual information disclosure.

     

/

返回文章
返回