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Abstract: Against the backdrop of further improving the governance mechanisms and regulatory systems of mixed-ownership enterprises, it merits in-depth investigation as to how non-state shareholders can effectively play a role in the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets through the appointment of directors and executives. Drawing on entry rights theory and using a sample of state-owned listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets, this study finds that the appointment of directors and executives by non-state shareholders significantly promotes the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets. The underlying mechanisms are as follows: (1) Non-state directors obtain decision-making entry rights over major risk-related matters and significant investments, which amplify monitoring over management, thereby reducing the occurrence of violations and penalties, and strengthen intervention in corporate development strategy, thereby curbing overinvestment. (2) Non-state executives obtain execution entry rights that grant them direct control over the firm's human, financial, and material resources, which guide capital toward high-value-added technological innovation domains, enable refined management of the R & D process, and improve the efficiency of patent output. Further analysis reveals that a high level of internal control provides supportive conditions for the exercise of entry rights by non-state directors and executives, and that debt-to-equity conversion broadens the financial authorization scope of non-state executives, thereby strengthening their contribution to the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets. The effect of non-state shareholders' appointment of directors and executives on the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets is more pronounced in provinces with higher levels of marketization, in firms at higher administrative levels, and in firms with less heterogeneity in the professional backgrounds of directors and executives. This paper extends the research perspective on mixed-ownership reform from "mixing ownership" to "improving governance", offering implications for achieving high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.