Abstract:
Risk cases such as the "Fuxing Case" have exposed systematic deficiencies in China's private fund custody system regarding rule supply, mandatory custody, legal status, and duty boundaries. This article examines the institutional dilemmas across four dimensions: internal conflicts and gaps in current rules, allowance for contractual exclusion of custodians creating hidden risks for individual cases, unclear legal status of custodians, and ambiguous duty boundaries. It reviews and summarizes the regulatory experiences of mature private fund markets in Europe and the United States and, drawing on these insights while considering China's regulatory requirements for strict protection of investors' legitimate rights and interests, proposes systematic improvement recommendations for China's private fund custody system: First, construct a multi-tiered rule system with complete hierarchy and unified philosophy. Second, establish an institutional arrangement for mandatory custody of all fund types. Third, clarify the legal status of custodians as "independent trustees". Fourth, delineate custodians' basic duties of reasonable care as professional institutions and their categorized duties, consolidating statutory minimum custody requirements.