Abstract:
Using the sample of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020, the paper investigates the impact of the exitthreat of institutional investors on the opportunistic stock selling of executives and its mechanism. This study finds that the exitthreat of institutional investors can effectively restrain the opportunistic stock selling behavior of executives, and the exit threat ofinstitutional investors has a significant governance effect. The exit threat of institutional investors effectively reduces stock pricevolatility and pricing errors, which significantly restrains the opportunistic stock selling of executives. The higher the environmentaluncertainty and management’s self-interest, the weaker the inhibitory effect of the exit threat of institutional investors on theopportunistic stock selling of executives. Further analysis finds that the impact of the exit threat of institutional investors on theopportunistic stock selling of executives is stronger when the institutional investors in the listed companies are transaction-oriented,when there is an equity pledge, and when the property rights are non-state-owned enterprises. In addition, the governance effect ofthe exit threat of institutional investors has positive consequences, including significantly inhibiting the rent-seeking of executives’stock selling, increasing corporate value, and reducing the opportunistic nature of the stock selling of executives.
下载:
