Abstract:
In the context of high-quality development and the "dual carbon" goals (to peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060), studying how institutional investors influence corporate ESG performance is of great importance. Unlike research based on the shareholding perspective, this paper manually collects data on institutional investor-appointed directors and examines the impact and mechanism of institutional investor-appointed directors on corporate ESG performance using A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2023 as the sample. The study finds that in general, institutional investor-appointed directors exacerbate agency problems and reduce green technological innovation, thereby significantly lowering corporate ESG performance. The heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative impact of institutional investor-appointed directors on ESG performance is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises, companies with smaller boards, and when the appointed director does not serve as the board chairman. By distinguishing different types of institutional investors, the analysis finds that securities firms and trusts may have commercial relationships with companies and have poor independence. Their appointed directors have a more significant effect on reducing the company's ESG performance. Directors appointed by qualified foreign institutional investors, who have stronger independence and focus more on corporate long-term development, improve corporate ESG performance to some extent. Directors appointed by funds and insurance companies, which may pay less attention to ESG performance, show no significant impact on corporate ESG performance. This study provides references for formulating differentiated regulatory policies for institutional investors and promoting corporate sustainable development.
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