周育红, 刘贤铤, 曾莹莹. 政府引导基金容错机制促进了企业创新吗?[J]. 证券市场导报, 2026, (2): 3-15.
引用本文: 周育红, 刘贤铤, 曾莹莹. 政府引导基金容错机制促进了企业创新吗?[J]. 证券市场导报, 2026, (2): 3-15.
Zhou Yuhong, Liu Xianting, Zeng Yingying. Does the Fault Tolerance Mechanism of Government Guidance Funds Promote Corporate Innovation?[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (2): 3-15.
Citation: Zhou Yuhong, Liu Xianting, Zeng Yingying. Does the Fault Tolerance Mechanism of Government Guidance Funds Promote Corporate Innovation?[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (2): 3-15.

政府引导基金容错机制促进了企业创新吗?

Does the Fault Tolerance Mechanism of Government Guidance Funds Promote Corporate Innovation?

  • 摘要: 在创新型企业亟需融资而政府引导基金仍有资金沉积的背景下,容错机制能否平衡创新型企业高风险特征与财政资金安全性要求,提升政府引导基金对企业的支持质效?本文基于政府引导基金管理办法文本分析和政府引导基金投资事件研究,发现:(1)容错机制为企业创新提供了试错空间,能显著促进企业创新“量质齐升”,且在中小微、成长期、获得地方产业政策支持企业中,以及管理机构属国资、基金行政设立层级较高的情形下作用更显著。(2)容错机制影响了政府引导基金管理机构的投资决策,显著降低了创新型企业的资金约束,从而提高了企业创新水平。一方面,尽职免责条款能避免将不可控因素导致的项目失败归因于管理机构,激励管理机构敢于投资、企业敢于创新; 另一方面,投资失败容忍程度规定了政府引导基金可接受的最大资金损失比例,能为企业创新提供相对宽容的资金使用环境。(3)相较单独实施尽职免责制度,同时设置投资失败容忍程度的成效更显著。(4)随着投资失败容忍程度提高,企业创新数量和质量均先上升后下降,呈现倒U型关系; 失败容忍程度设置需平衡创新激励效应与道德风险问题。本文丰富了政府引导基金内部运行机制的相关研究,也为积极落实容错机制、促进企业创新提供了实证支持。

     

    Abstract: In the context where innovative enterprises urgently need financing while government guidance funds still have retained capital, can fault tolerance mechanisms balance the high risks of enterprises with the safety of fiscal funds, effectively enhance the support of government guidance funds for enterprises? This study finds that: (1) Fault tolerance mechanisms provide enterprises with room for trial and error, significantly promoting the simultaneous improvement in both the quantity and quality of corporate innovation. The effects are more pronounced among micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises, growth-stage firms, and enterprises receiving local industrial policy support, as well as in cases where management institutions are state-owned entities or where the funds are established at higher administrative levels. (2) Fault tolerance mechanisms influence the investment decisions of government guidance fund managers, significantly alleviating financing constraints of innovative enterprises, thereby enhancing innovation performance. On the one hand, due diligence exemption clauses prevent the attribution of project failures caused by uncontrollable factors to management institutions, incentivizing managers to invest boldly and enterprises to innovate courageously. On the other hand, investment failure tolerance thresholds stipulate the maximum acceptable capital loss ratio for government guidance funds, providing a relatively tolerant environment for corporate innovation expenditures. (3) Compared with implementing the due diligence exemption system alone, simultaneously establishing investment failure tolerance thresholds yields more significant effects. (4) As investment failure tolerance thresholds increase, both the quantity and quality of corporate innovation first rise and then decline, exhibiting an inverted U-shaped relationship; the setting of failure tolerance thresholds needs to balance innovation incentive effects against moral hazard concerns. This study enriches the literature on the internal operational mechanisms of government guidance funds and provides empirical support for actively implementing fault tolerance mechanisms to promote corporate innovation.

     

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