Abstract:
Recently, the absence of actual controllers has become increasingly prevalent, but there are fewer studies on corporate governance issues arising from the absence of actual controllers. Based on the sample of A-share non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2021, this paper empirically tests the impact of the absence of actual controllers on opportunistic stock selling of insiders in terms of supervisory and informational advantages. The study finds that the absence of actual controllers is significantly and positively associated with the opportunistic stock-selling behavior of insiders. The mechanism analysis suggests that the absence of actual controllers weakens the supervision of insider behavior and reduces information transparency, thereby affecting insider opportunistic stock selling. Further research shows that improving the internal corporate governance and the external rule of law environment can significantly alleviate the impact of the absence of actual controllers on insider opportunistic stock-selling behavior. However, the number of opportunistic insider stock selling is higher when there are controlling shareholders in the firm without actual controllers. This paper helps to strengthen the supervision of insider opportunistic stock-selling behavior and provides insights on improving the regulation of the absence of actual controllers.
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