郭振雄, 袁春生, 李佳姗. 机构投资者实地调研如何抑制企业AI漂洗J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (9): 47-57, 80.
引用本文: 郭振雄, 袁春生, 李佳姗. 机构投资者实地调研如何抑制企业AI漂洗J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (9): 47-57, 80.
Guo Zhenxiong, Yuan Chunsheng, Li Jiashan. How Do Institutional Investors' On-Site Visits Curb Corporate AI Washing?J. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (9): 47-57, 80.
Citation: Guo Zhenxiong, Yuan Chunsheng, Li Jiashan. How Do Institutional Investors' On-Site Visits Curb Corporate AI Washing?J. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (9): 47-57, 80.

机构投资者实地调研如何抑制企业AI漂洗

How Do Institutional Investors' On-Site Visits Curb Corporate AI Washing?

  • 摘要: 随着市场对人工智能的关注持续升温,企业AI漂洗的程度不断加深,并从科技行业向传统行业扩散,不利于企业专注主业经营,还增加了股价波动风险。AI技术具有高度专业且信息不透明的特点,机构投资者实地调研如何发挥监督治理作用、抑制企业AI漂洗值得深入研究。本文综合利用企业年报、AI专利与招聘信息等多源数据,研究发现机构投资者实地调研有效抑制了企业AI漂洗,且该效应具有多期持续性。作用机制在于:(1)提升信息透明度。机构投资者实地调研具有专业性与现场互动性,聚焦企业战略核心与竞争壁垒,追问技术细节与工程挑战,将原本难以理解的AI技术部分转化为可验证的信号,压缩企业策略性信息披露的空间。(2)提高内部控制质量。机构投资者实地调研具有利益关联性与随机性,有更强的动机关注和监督企业行为,打破企业对信息披露时机与节奏的掌控,形成持续的外部监督压力。进一步研究发现,在企业信息透明度较低时,机构投资者实地调研更能发挥信息挖掘和外部监督作用,与信息披露监管形成合力,抑制企业AI漂洗。此外,政府AI监管力度提升、企业机构投资者持股比例提高、机构投资者调研深度提升,均能强化机构投资者实地调研对企业AI漂洗的抑制效应。经济后果检验表明,机构投资者实地调研通过抑制企业AI漂洗,提高了资本市场信息效率。本文明晰了机构投资者实地调研的治理价值,也为加强信息披露监管提供了参考。

     

    Abstract: As market attention to artificial intelligence continues to intensify, the extent of corporate AI-washing has deepened progressively, spreading from the technology sector to traditional industries. This phenomenon is detrimental to firms' focus on their core business operations and further exacerbates stock price volatility risk. Given that AI technology is characterized by a high degree of specialization and information opacity, it is worth investigating in depth how institutional investors' on-site visits exert a monitoring and governance function to curb corporate AI-washing. Drawing on multi-source data including corporate annual reports, AI patents, and recruitment information, this study finds that institutional investors' on-site visits effectively suppress corporate AI-washing, and that this effect exhibits persistence across multiple periods. The underlying mechanisms are twofold. First, site visits enhance information transparency. Because such visits are professional in nature and involve on-site interaction, they focus on firms' strategic core and competitive barriers and probe technical details and engineering challenges, thereby transforming otherwise opaque aspects of AI technology into verifiable signals and narrowing the scope for strategic information disclosure. Second, site visits improve internal control quality. Institutional investors' on-site visits are characterized by both stake-related interest and a degree of unpredictability, which provide institutional investors with stronger incentives to monitor corporate behavior, disrupt firms' control over the timing and pacing of information disclosure, and thereby exert sustained external monitoring pressure. Further analysis reveals that when corporate information transparency is relatively low, institutional investors' on-site visits are more effective in fulfilling their information-mining and external monitoring functions, working in tandem with information disclosure regulation to jointly suppress corporate AI-washing. What is more, by curbing corporate AI washing, institutional investors' site visits improve the information efficiency of the capital market. The examination of economic consequences shows that the governance value of institutional investors' site visits and offers implications for strengthening the regulation of information disclosure.

     

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