邢会强, 崔巍. 内幕交易抗辩事由中的预定交易计划[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (9): 57-67.
引用本文: 邢会强, 崔巍. 内幕交易抗辩事由中的预定交易计划[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (9): 57-67.
Xing Huiqiang, Cui Wei. Pre-Arranged Trading Plans as an Affirmative Defense in Insider Trading Cases[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (9): 57-67.
Citation: Xing Huiqiang, Cui Wei. Pre-Arranged Trading Plans as an Affirmative Defense in Insider Trading Cases[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (9): 57-67.

内幕交易抗辩事由中的预定交易计划

Pre-Arranged Trading Plans as an Affirmative Defense in Insider Trading Cases

  • 摘要: 预定交易计划是内幕交易抗辩事由之一。行为人能证明其表面上符合内幕交易构成要件的行为是执行预定交易计划的,免于承担内幕交易的法律责任。我国在相关司法解释中虽对此进行了原则性规定,但仍有待证券监管机构进一步出台专门规则予以细化。借鉴美国2022年对10b5-1规则的最新修订,提出以下政策建议:我国的预定交易计划细则,应秉持善意原则,防止预定交易计划被滥用;强化信息披露要求,确保交易计划的透明度;设置合理的冷静期,防止内幕信息的即时利用;限制交易计划的重叠,确保交易计划的单一性和连续性;严格控制预定交易计划的取消和修改等。

     

    Abstract: Pre-arranged trading plans constitute one of the affirmative defenses against insider trading charges. When actors can demonstrate that their conduct, which literally meets the constituent elements of insider trading, was executed pursuant to a pre-arranged trading plan, they are exempted from legal liability for insider trading. Although China has established principle-based provisions regarding this matter in relevant judicial interpretations, specialized rules issued by securities regulatory authorities are still needed for further refinement. Drawing on the latest amendments to Rule 10b5-1 in the United States in 2022, the following policy recommendations are proposed: (1) China's detailed rules for pre-arranged trading plans should adhere to the good faith principle to prevent abuse of such plans; (2) strengthen information disclosure requirements to ensure the transparency of trading plans; (3) establish reasonable cooling-off periods to prevent immediate exploitation of inside information; (4) restrict overlapping trading plans to ensure the singularity and continuity of trading plans; and (5) strictly control the cancellation and modification of pre-arranged trading plans.

     

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