Abstract:
Institutional investors such as China Securities Finance Corporation and Central Huijin Investment, collectively known as the "national team", have played a crucial stabilizing role in the capital market. However, their participation in corporate governance and influence on corporate distribution decisions warrant further investigation. Using cash dividend policy as the entry point and based on a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, this study finds that "national team" shareholding significantly promotes cash dividend payments among portfolio companies. The underlying mechanisms operate through three channels: first, by sending positive signals to the market, broadening financing channels and reducing financing costs, thereby alleviating corporate financing constraints; second, by exercising supervisory functions and providing professional assistance, prompting companies to improve internal control systems and effectively reduce operational and financial risks; third, by actively participating in corporate governance, constraining opportunistic behaviors of controlling shareholders and management, and improving the corporate information environment. Further analysis reveals that for companies with lower managerial ownership and those located in regions with lower marketization levels, "national team" shareholding better compensates for deficiencies in internal and external governance mechanisms. China Securities Finance Corporation and Central Huijin Investment typically participate deeply in corporate governance as strategic investors, thereby strengthening dividend constraints. Additionally, "national team" shareholding does not exacerbate the intertemporal volatility of cash dividends but rather enhances dividend stability. This paper provides evidence from the Chinese market on how macroeconomic policy instruments influence micro-level corporate distribution decisions, and offers insights for further optimizing the dividend system of listed companies.
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