钟维, 刘慈航. 程序化交易违法行为规制路径的反思与重构J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (7): 15-25, 38.
引用本文: 钟维, 刘慈航. 程序化交易违法行为规制路径的反思与重构J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (7): 15-25, 38.
Zhong Wei, Liu Cihang. Reflection and Reconstruction of the Regulatory Path for Illegal Algorithmic Trading BehaviorsJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (7): 15-25, 38.
Citation: Zhong Wei, Liu Cihang. Reflection and Reconstruction of the Regulatory Path for Illegal Algorithmic Trading BehaviorsJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (7): 15-25, 38.

程序化交易违法行为规制路径的反思与重构

Reflection and Reconstruction of the Regulatory Path for Illegal Algorithmic Trading Behaviors

  • 摘要: 程序化交易在提升证券期货市场流动性与效率的同时,也可能通过高频报撤单、算法诱导等方式引发新的市场失序风险。既有以反操纵条款为中心的规制路径,以人为价格和操纵意图为核心构成要件,在算法高频化、决策自动化背景下面临证明困难与适用失灵,难以有效覆盖幌骗、分层等具有显著扰乱市场效应但未必构成价格操纵的新型违法行为。程序化交易违法行为的实质不完全体现为价格扭曲,还表现为对市场信号真实、交易秩序稳定及交易系统安全的破坏。基于此,有必要立足《证券法》第45条与《期货和衍生品法》第21条的反扰乱条款,构建以市场秩序损害结果和扰乱市场意图为核心的责任认定结构,构建有别于反操纵条款的独立规制路径。特别是在主观要件层面,引入“鲁莽”(间接故意)作为行为人主观意图的最低标准,以降低对扰乱市场行为的规制难度。在体系层面,反扰乱条款与反操纵条款构成双层规制结构:一方面,即使行为人未构成操纵市场,只要其程序化交易活动对交易秩序或系统安全产生显著影响,即可依据反扰乱条款追究责任;另一方面,当程序化交易者的行为满足操纵市场的构成要件时,则可进一步由反操纵条款进行规制。

     

    Abstract: While algorithmic trading enhances the liquidity and efficiency of securities and futures markets, it may also trigger new market disorder risks through high-frequency order placement and cancellation, algorithmic inducement, and other means. The existing regulatory path centered on anti-manipulation provisions, with artificial prices and manipulative intent as core constitutive elements, faces evidentiary difficulties and application failures in the context of algorithmic high-frequency trading and automated decision-making, failing to effectively cover novel illegal behaviors such as spoofing and layering that significantly disrupt markets but do not necessarily constitute price manipulation. The essence of illegal algorithmic trading behaviors is not entirely manifested in price distortion, but also in the disruption of market signal authenticity, trading order stability, and trading system security. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish, based on Article 45 of the Securities Law and Article 21 of the Futures and Derivatives Law's anti-disruption provisions, a liability determination structure centered on market order damage consequences and intent to disrupt markets, constructing an independent regulatory path distinct from anti-manipulation provisions. Particularly regarding subjective elements, "recklessness" (indirect intent) should be introduced as the minimum standard for actors' subjective intent to reduce the difficulty of regulating market-disrupting behaviors. At the systemic level, anti-disruption provisions and anti-manipulation provisions constitute a dual-layer regulatory structure: on one hand, even when actors do not constitute market manipulation, as long as their algorithmic trading activities significantly impact trading order or system security, liability can be pursued under anti-disruption provisions; on the other hand, when algorithmic traders' behaviors satisfy the constitutive elements of market manipulation, they can be further regulated by anti-manipulation provisions.

     

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