陈作华, 于军. 内部人交易与公司债二级市场定价[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (11): 69-79.
引用本文: 陈作华, 于军. 内部人交易与公司债二级市场定价[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (11): 69-79.
Chen Zuohua, Yu Jun. Insider Trading and Secondary Market Corporate Bond Pricing[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (11): 69-79.
Citation: Chen Zuohua, Yu Jun. Insider Trading and Secondary Market Corporate Bond Pricing[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (11): 69-79.

内部人交易与公司债二级市场定价

Insider Trading and Secondary Market Corporate Bond Pricing

  • 摘要: 股市与债市联动紧密,债券投资者如何看待股市内部人交易,公司债二级市场定价是否受内部人交易影响,目前尚未有研究深入探讨。本文以沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验内部人增持交易、减持交易对公司债二级市场定价的影响。研究发现,内部人减持提高了公司债信用利差,内部人增持对公司债信用利差无显著影响。机制检验表明:(1)内部人减持可能向市场传递了公司股价高估等信号,加剧了股价波动,尤其是股价跌幅较大时,债券投资者可能认为公司基本面恶化、债券违约概率增加,会要求更高的风险溢价;(2)债券投资收益限制在合同约定的本金和利息内,使得债券投资者对风险的容忍度较低,对坏消息的敏感度相较好消息更高,债券价格也能更快捕捉到坏消息。异质性检验表明,内部人减持对公司债信用利差的影响在环境不确定性较强、未来现金流有减少趋势时更明显,而在董事会独立性较强、公司债流动性较好时相对不明显。进一步研究发现,内部人减持获利越多,公司债信用利差提高幅度越大;相较内部人常规性减持,内部人机会主义减持对公司债信用利差的影响更大。本文丰富了公司债二级市场定价的相关研究,也为进一步完善内部人交易监管提供了参考。

     

    Abstract: While stock and bond markets are closely linked, how bond investors view insider trading in the stock market and whether secondary corporate bond market pricing is affected by insider trading have not been thoroughly investigated. This paper empirically examines the impact of insider purchase and sale transactions on secondary corporate bond market pricing using Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples. The research finds that insider selling increases corporate bond credit spreads, while insider buying has no significant impact on credit spreads. Mechanism tests indicate: (1) Insider selling may transmits signals of overvaluation of the company's share price to the market and intensifies stock price volatility. Especially when the share price falls greatly, bond investors may perceive deterioration in company fundamentals and increased bond default probability, demanding higher risk premiums; (2) Bond investment returns are limited to contractually agreed principal and interest, resulting in lower risk tolerance among bond investors, higher sensitivity to bad news compared to good news, and bond prices that capture negative information more quickly. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of insider selling on corporate bond credit spreads is more pronounced in environments with greater uncertainty and when future cash flows show decreasing trends, while it is relatively less significant when board independence is stronger and corporate bond liquidity is better. Further research finds that the more profits insiders gain from selling, the greater the increase of corporate bond credit spread; compared to routine insider selling, opportunistic insider selling has a greater impact on corporate bond credit spreads. This paper enriches research on secondary corporate bond market pricing and provides references for further improving insider trading regulation.

     

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