张明睿, 刘伟, 黄兴. 政府引导基金与企业内部薪酬结构——基于耐心资本视角[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (12): 16-26.
引用本文: 张明睿, 刘伟, 黄兴. 政府引导基金与企业内部薪酬结构——基于耐心资本视角[J]. 证券市场导报, 2025, (12): 16-26.
Zhang Mingrui, Liu Wei, Huang Xing. Government Guidance Funds and Corporate Internal Salary Structure: A Patient Capital Perspective[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (12): 16-26.
Citation: Zhang Mingrui, Liu Wei, Huang Xing. Government Guidance Funds and Corporate Internal Salary Structure: A Patient Capital Perspective[J]. Securities Market Herald, 2025, (12): 16-26.

政府引导基金与企业内部薪酬结构——基于耐心资本视角

Government Guidance Funds and Corporate Internal Salary Structure: A Patient Capital Perspective

  • 摘要: 如何优化企业内部薪酬分配、有效平衡效率与公平,是关乎企业高质量发展的重要议题。本文基于耐心资本视角,探讨政府引导基金对企业内部收入差距的影响。研究发现,政府引导基金更关注政策目标与企业长期价值,倾向于采取长期主义的公司治理策略与薪酬结构安排,显著缩小了企业内部薪酬差距,这种差距的缩小主要源于薪酬结构的优化调整,而非企业整体薪酬水平的下降。其作用机制一是存量收益再分配,提高普通员工的现金薪酬占比,使既有利润由管理层向员工倾斜;二是增量价值再分配,将新增利润更多地以工资、绩效奖金等方式分配给员工;三是监督治理效应,压缩高管寻租空间,强化企业经营决策和薪酬激励的长期导向。异质性分析发现,上述效应在垄断性行业,职工议价能力较弱、技术密集型以及投资者耐心程度较高的企业中更显著。本文拓展了政府引导基金经济后果的相关研究,也为培育耐心资本、完善企业薪酬体系提供了参考。

     

    Abstract: How to optimize internal compensation distribution and effectively balance efficiency with equity is a crucial issue concerning high-quality corporate development. This paper explores the impact of government guidance funds on corporate internal income gaps from the perspective of patient capital. The study finds that government guidance funds focus more on policy objectives and long-term corporate value, tend to adopt long-termist corporate governance strategies and compensation structure arrangements, and significantly narrow corporate internal compensation gaps. Such narrowing gap primarily stems from the optimization and adjustment of compensation structures, rather than a decline in overall corporate compensation levels. The mechanisms include: first, redistribution of existing returns by increasing the proportion of cash compensation for ordinary employees, shifting existing profits from management to employees; second, redistribution of incremental value by allocating new profits more to employees through wages, performance bonuses, and other means; third, supervisory governance effect by compressing executive rent-seeking space and reinforcing long-term orientation in corporate business decisions and compensation incentives. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that these effects are more pronounced in monopolistic industries, firms with weaker employee bargaining power, technology-intensive enterprises, and companies with more patient investors. This paper extends research on the economic consequences of government guidance funds and provides references for cultivating patient capital and improving corporate compensation systems.

     

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