Abstract:
Regulatory rules governing board secretaries have promoted a shift from concurrent to dedicated appointments. How this transition reshapes the corporate information environment and subsequently affects stock liquidity merits in-depth research. Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies that historically adopted concurrent board secretary arrangements, this study finds that the dedicated appointment of board secretaries significantly enhances stock liquidity, and this conclusion remains robust after controlling for sample self-selection, omitted variables, and reverse causality. The underlying mechanisms are threefold. First, this arrangement improves the quality of information disclosure by strengthening information organization and review, thereby narrowing information gaps among investors. Second, it reinforces regulatory compliance by enhancing compliance scrutiny and risk screening, thereby improving the reliability of public information. Third, it strengthens two-way communication by increasing investment in investor relations management, thereby reducing investors' costs of acquiring and understanding information. Further analysis reveals that stock liquidity improves significantly after incumbent board secretaries relinquish their concurrent positions, and this improvement is more pronounced among firms whose board secretaries bore heavier workloads prior to the transition, indicating that the benefits of alleviating role conflict from dedicated appointment generally outweigh the losses in information advantages. Stock liquidity also improves significantly when the incumbent board secretary is replaced by a successor, suggesting that this effect primarily reflects the role adjustment of dedicated appointment itself. The effect of dedicated appointment in enhancing stock liquidity is more pronounced among firms in low-competition industries, non-state-owned enterprises, firms facing high financing constraints, firms with low business complexity, and firms whose original board secretaries concurrently held financial or managerial positions. The improvement in the information environment brought about by dedicated appointment can be recognized by external investors, as evidenced by increases in institutional ownership, long-term institutional ownership, and the patient capital index. This study provides a reference for deepening the understanding of the professionalized board secretary system and for further improving capital market liquidity.
下载:
