Abstract:
On the basis of clearing risky companies, whether the normalized delisting mechanism can improve the information efficiency of the capital market is an important question that needs to be answered in evaluating the effectiveness of delisting system reform. Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies, this paper constructs a multi-time point difference-in-differences model and finds that corporate mandatory delisting significantly reduces the stock price synchronicity of peer companies. Mechanism tests indicate that, on the one hand, mandatory delisting prompts peer companies to improve their information disclosure quality through regulatory deterrence, market competition, and external supervision; on the other hand, by releasing industry risk signals, it enhances investor attention and prompts investors to collect firm-specific information of peer companies, thereby incorporating more firm-specific information into stock prices. Further analyses find that the above effects are more significant when delisted companies are larger in size, peer companies exhibit lower internal control quality, or media attention is higher. Trading-related, financial-related, and major-violation-related mandatory delistings all significantly reduce the stock price synchronicity of peer companies, while the impact of compliance-related mandatory delisting remains insignificant. This paper extends research on the economic consequences of mandatory delisting from the perspective of industry spillover and provides empirical evidence for improving the normalized delisting mechanism.
下载:
