黄洁, 范合君, 朱维端. IPO现场督导制度与保荐机构执业质量J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (4): 3-12.
引用本文: 黄洁, 范合君, 朱维端. IPO现场督导制度与保荐机构执业质量J. 证券市场导报, 2026, (4): 3-12.
Huang Jie, Fan Hejun, Zhu Weiduan. IPO On-site Supervision System and Professional Quality of Sponsor InstitutionsJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (4): 3-12.
Citation: Huang Jie, Fan Hejun, Zhu Weiduan. IPO On-site Supervision System and Professional Quality of Sponsor InstitutionsJ. Securities Market Herald, 2026, (4): 3-12.

IPO现场督导制度与保荐机构执业质量

IPO On-site Supervision System and Professional Quality of Sponsor Institutions

  • 摘要: 作为压实保荐机构“看门人”责任的重要举措,IPO现场督导制度的成效如何值得系统评估。本文以沪深A股市场保荐机构为样本,手工收集整理招股说明书申报稿、问询函、法律意见书和监管函等公开文件,采用多期双重差分模型检验IPO现场督导对保荐机构执业质量的影响。研究发现,IPO现场督导显著提高了保荐机构执业质量,具体表现为IPO项目过会数量和过会率均有所上升,在审计、法律与内部控制等合规环节表现更优,被保荐企业上市前后的信息披露质量提高。其作用机制在于:(1)现场督导以查阅底稿、访谈人员等方式实施穿透式监管,同时采用问题导向与随机抽取的方式确定督导对象,促使保荐机构在项目筛选、尽职调查方面提升专业能力;(2)现场督导结果供后续审核参考和执业评价,保荐机构为降低未来监管风险,更加重视内部控制与流程规范,推动合规行为由外在要求向组织惯例转化;(3)督导信息通过问询反馈、监管公告等方式对外发布,强化了市场对“优质中介”与“优质项目”间的联动预期,促使保荐机构在信息披露上更注重完整性与透明度。进一步分析表明,相较非国有机构,IPO现场督导对国有保荐机构执业质量的影响总体更显著;IPO现场督导对低声誉机构的影响更多体现为专业能力和合规表现提升,对高声誉机构的影响更多体现为信息披露质量提高。本文揭示了IPO现场督导重塑中介机构行为的作用机制,也为深化注册制改革、推动资本市场高质量发展提供参考。

     

    Abstract: As a crucial measure to reinforce the "gatekeeper" responsibilities of sponsor institutions, the effectiveness of the IPO on-site supervision system warrants systematic evaluation. Using sponsor institutions in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets as samples, this study manually collects and organizes publicly available documents including prospectus drafts, inquiry letters, legal opinions, and regulatory letters, employing a multi-period difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the IPO on-site supervision on the professional quality of sponsor institutions. The findings reveal that the IPO on-site supervision significantly enhances the professional quality of sponsor institutions, as manifested in the increased numbers and approval rates of IPO projects, better performance in compliance aspects including auditing, legal affairs, and internal control, and improved information disclosure quality of sponsored enterprises both pre- and post-listing. The mechanisms operate through: (1) The on-site supervision implements penetrative supervision by examining working papers and interviewing personnel, while adopting problem-oriented and random sampling approaches to determine supervision targets, prompting sponsor institutions to enhance professional capabilities in project screening and due diligence; (2) On-site supervision results serve as references for subsequent reviews and professional evaluations, incentivizing sponsor institutions to prioritize internal control and procedural compliance to mitigate future regulatory risks, thereby transforming compliant behavior from external requirements to organizational routines; (3) Supervision information is disseminated through inquiry feedback and regulatory announcements, reinforcing market expectations regarding the linkage between "quality intermediaries" and "quality projects", motivating sponsor institutions to emphasize completeness and transparency in information disclosure. Further analysis indicates that compared to non-state-owned institutions, the IPO on-site supervision exerts a more significant overall impact on the professional quality of state-owned sponsor institutions; for low-reputation institutions, the impact manifests primarily through enhanced professional capabilities and compliance performance, whereas for high-reputation institutions, it predominantly reflects improved information disclosure quality. This study reveals the mechanisms through which the IPO on-sitesupervision reshapes intermediary behavior and provides references for deepening the registration-based IPO system reform and promoting the high-quality development of the capital market.

     

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