Abstract:
Some viewpoints suggest that the lack of "exit" options for the state makes it difficult to impose effective constraints on agents, which is one of the reasons for the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). With the introduction of non-state shareholders possessing exit rights through mixed-ownership reform, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the exit threat of non-state shareholders can play a market-based governance role. Using a sample of A-share listed non-financial SOEs on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this paper empirically examines the impact of exit threats of non-state shareholders on SOE performance and the moderating effect of allocation of control rights. The findings are summarized as follows. (1) The exit threat of non-state shareholders can restrain opportunistic behavior by SOE management, correct internal cognitive biases, and optimize investment and operational decisions, thereby improving SOE performance through cost reduction and efficiency enhancement. (2) In terms of SOEs' control hierarchy, shareholding concentration, and rights allocation, local SOEs have stronger incentives for localized reform and typically have a higher proportion of non-state ownership, which amplifies the constraining effect of exit threats. Since the ownership structure of SOEs with relative-majority ownership is relatively dispersed, and controlling shareholders of enterprises with a higher degree of separation between ownership and control have a greater demand for control rights, the deterrent effect of potential control transfer caused by non-state shareholders' exit is more pronounced. (3) Regarding industry characteristics and the ownership nature of non-state shareholders, financial shareholders possess professional advantages in investment operations and information mining, enabling them to bargain with SOE management. Compared to foreign shareholders, private shareholders face fewer language and cultural barriers, allowing them to intervene in SOE management behavior in a reasonable manner through communication and thus having a more significant effect on improving the performance of SOEs. (4) From the perspective of the functional positioning of SOEs, commercially competitive SOEs place greater emphasis on economic efficiency and non-state shareholders play a more prominent role in a market-driven competitive environment. Therefore, the exit threat of non-state shareholders has a more pronounced effect on improving the performance of commercially competitive SOEs than on function-specific SOEs that play a leading role in the national economy and undertake responsibilities such as security assurance. This study enriches the literature on non-state shareholder governance under mixed-ownership reform and provides references for further improving the shareholder governance mechanism of SOEs and promoting the high-quality development of SOEs.
下载:
